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CHAPTER 20 
Education Law 
STEPHEN F. ROACH 
§20.1. General. This chapter will consist of three parts, relating 
to legislation, court decisions, and opinions of the Attorney General, as 
these sources of law were concerned with educational activities within 
the Commonwealth during the 1965 SURVEY year. 
For editorial convenience, all significant court decisions and Attorney 
General opinions which were handed down between the dates Septem-
ber 1, 1964, and August 31, 1965, inclusive, and became available, are 
included. All acts and resolves of the General Court which were ap-
proved during the 1965 regular session through August 31, 1965, are 
also included. Acts and resolves relating to education which were ap-
proved after August 31, 1965, will be reported in the next ANNUAL 
SURVEY. 
No attempt has been made to consider administrative decisions, or 
rules and regulations, of the State Board of Education or the State De-
partment of Education. 
A. LEGISLATION 
§20.2. Reorganization of state educational system. Two enact-
ments of the 1965 legislature may well serve as landmarks for educa-
tion. Each was clearly influenced by an exhaustive study made by citi-
zen groups and presented to the General Court1 and the State Board of 
Education2 respectively. 
Chapter 572 of the Acts of 1965 established a 13-member Board of 
Education. The act assigned as the general purposes of the Board "to 
support, serve and plan" general education in the public schools; au-
thorized the Board to establish or approve the length for the school day 
and year, the educational standards for the appointment of professional 
personnel in the public schools, the maximum pupil-teacher ratios for 
DR. STEPHEN F. ROACH is Professor of Education at Boston College and is editor 
of the School Law Review newsletters. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the work of Michael L. Altman, of the Board 
of Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY, in the preparation of Section C of this chapter. 
§20.2 1 Quality Education for Massachusetts, Summary Report of the Special 
Commission Relative to Improving and Extending Educational Facilities in the 
Commonwealth, December, 1964. See full reports in House Nos. 3300, 3301 (1965). 
2 Because It Is Right-Educationally, Report of the Massachusetts Advisory 
Committee on Racial Imbalance and Education (Mass. Dept. of Education, April, 
1965). 
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school classes, the ages for school attendance, the minimum educational 
standards for all public school courses, and the minimum standards for 
all public school buildings; charged the Board with evaluating, an-
nually, the efficacy of the state aid formula; and authorized the Board 
to withhold state and federal funds from local school committees which 
fail to comply with the provisions of law relative to the operation of 
the public schools. Chapter 572 also: (1) established the position of 
Commissioner of Education as the chief state school officer for elemen-
tary and secondary education; (2) established the positions of Deputy 
Commissioner, Associate Commissioner, and Assistant Commissioner; 
and (3) organized the State Department of Education into five divi-
sions: (a) curriculum and instruction, (b) administration and personnel, 
(c) research and development, (d) school facilities and related services, 
and (e) state and federal assistance. 
In addition, Chapter 572 established an II-member Board of Higher 
Education. The act assigned as the general purposes of this Board "to 
support, facilitate, and delineate functions and programs for public in-
stitutions ... of higher education ... to plan and develop efficient and 
effective coordination among them ... and to promote the best interests 
of all higher education" throughout the Commonwealth. The position 
of Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education was established as its 
chief executive officer. 
Chapter 572 further established a 9-member advisory Council on 
Education and assigned as the general purposes of the Council "to 
recommend policies designed to improve the performance of all public 
educational systems" in the Commonwealth. It established the position 
of Director of Research to be the Council's executive secretary. 
Finally, Chapter 572 set out various provisions relating to the gov-
ernance and supervision of the university, the state colleges, the re-
gional community colleges, the technological institutes, and the regula-
tion of school attendance. 
§20.3. Racial imbalance. Chapter 641 of the Acts of 1965 pro-
vided for the elimination of racial imbalance in the public schools of 
the Commonwealth. This is believed to be the first such state-wide 
statute in the nation. 
The statute, which added Sections 11 through IK to General Laws, 
Chapter 15, and Sections 37C and 37D to General Laws, Chapter 71, 
declared it to be state policy to encourage all school committees to 
adopt as educational objectives "the promotion of racial balance and 
the correction of existing racial imbalance in the schools. The preven-
tion or elimination of racial imbalance shall be an objective in all de-
cisions involving the drawing or altering of school attendance lines and 
the selection of new school sites." 
The term "racial imbalance" was to refer to "a ratio between non-
white and other students in public schools which is sharply out of 
balance with the racial composition of the society in which non-white 
children study, serve and work." Racial imbalance would be deemed to 
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exist "when the per cent of non·white students in any public school is 
in excess of fifty per cent of the total number of students in such 
school." 
The statute requires that: (1) each school committee submit an an-
nual racial census for each of its schools; (2) each school committee in-
volved be notified if the State Board of Education finds racial imbal-
ance to exist in one of its schools; and (3) each such school committee 
"thereupon prepare a plan to eliminate such racial imbalance" and file 
a copy with the State Board. Plans must detail the methods to be em-
ployed, and are to include proposed changes in existing school atten-
dance districts, locations of proposed school sites, proposed additions to 
existing buildings and sites, and projections of expected racial compo-
sition of all schools. 
Any plan must also "take into consideration . . . the safety of the 
children involved in travelling" between home and school. A plan 
might provide for "voluntary cooperation" by other communities; but 
no school committee "shall be required ... to transport any pupil to 
any school outside its jurisdiction or to any school outside the school 
[attendance] district established for his neighborhood" if the parent 
objects. 
When a school committee "does not show progress within a reason-
able time in eliminating racial imbalance in its schools," the Commis-
sioner of Education is not to certify the community for state aid, nor 
is the School Building Assistance Commission to approve any project 
for school construction for the community. But, when the State Board 
of Education "is satisfied that the construction or enlargement of a 
schoolhouse is for the purpose of reducing or eliminating racial im-
balance" the amounts of grants for construction are to be increased 
from the present 40 per cent to 65 per cent of the approved cost. Pro-
cedures for judicial review and enforcement are also specified. 
Finally, the statute requires that an Advisory Committee of Racial 
Imbalance be appointed by the State Board of Education, but that no 
individual be appointed thereto "who has been listed in any state or 
federal document as being a member of a communist front organiza-
tion." 
On August 17, 1965, in reply to questions raised by the Governor as 
to the constitutionality of Chapter 641 and as to whether the entire 
Chapter would be affected should a given provision prove to be un-
constitutional, the Attorney General gave as his opinion that there 
"can be no question that [all] the provisions [excepting the final para-
graph, which provided for the Advisory Committee] are valid enact-
ments ... completely in accord with both the Federal and the State 
Constitutions." 
With regard to the provision relating to the Advisory Committee-
and particularly with the prohibition of the appointment thereto of 
any person "who has been listed in any state or federal document as 
being a .member of a communist front organization" - the Attorney 
General advised: 
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It was obviously the purpose of the General Court to prohibit the 
appointment of Communist Party members and sympathizers to 
the . . . Advisory Committee. . . . It is not the decision to bar 
Communists . . . but the means by which this decision is to be 
implemented, which must be examined .... The fact that a person 
has been listed in a governmental document as a member of a 
Communist front organization is, in my opinion, far from an effec-
tive guide to a determination whether such a person is in fact a 
Communist or a Communist sympathizer. It is clear that if such 
a standard is used both Communists and non-Communists could 
be barred from the Advisory Committee. Thus the legislature will 
have created an arbitrary distinction between non-Communists 
who happen to have been mentioned in a governmental document 
as members of Communist front organizations and non-Commu-
nists who have not been so men,tioned. As such, the provision 
represents an unreasonable legislative classification which denies 
to certain persons the rights which are enjoyed by others in the 
same category. It is my considered opinion, therefore, that the pro-
vision in question contravenes the "equal protection" clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
and is ... an invalid and ineffective exercise of legislative authority. 
The Attorney General concluded: "Accordingly, it is my opinion 
that the unconstitutional portion of the last paragraph of the Act may 
be severed from the remainder, and that - despite the invalidity of 
this provision - the measure as a whole will, upon [gubernatorial] 
approval, be fully effective." 
§20.4. Other legislation. Other general acts1 of the regular session 
of the 1965 legislature have significance to education. General Laws, 
Chapter 31, governing civil service, was amended by Acts of 1965, 
Chapter 157. Section 4A was added to the chapter. The new section 
provides that when a new regional vocational school committee votes 
to accept the provisions of the section, all nonacademic positions in the 
regional or regional vocational school district are made subject to the 
civil service law and rules "whether or not the municipalities compris-
ing the district have accepted the provisions of this chapter." 
Lists of eligibles shall be established on the basis of the school dis-
tricts. Applicants for positions are required to "have been domiciled in 
a city or town comprising the ... district" in which they seek service 
for six months prior to filing application. 
Section 5 of General Laws, Chapter 40, was amended to authorize a 
city or town to appropriate money to provide indemnity insurance for 
"any teacher in its employ, as provided under section lOOC, chapter 41, 
against loss by reason of any damages or expenses under said section."2 
Under General Laws, Chapter 41, Section lOOC, a city, town, or re-
§20.4. 1 Enactments through Acts of 1965, c. 6711 (~proved August lIl, 1965), 
were reviewed for this section. 
2 Acts of 1965, c. 179. 
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gional school district, acting by its school committee, "shall ... indem-
nify" a teacher in its employ, in certain cases, for expenses or damages 
sustained by him by reason of an action or claim for acts done by him 
while acting as a teacher. 
General Laws, Chapter 71, governing public schools, was extensively 
amended during the 1965 SURVEY year. Section 16 was amended to add 
to the powers and duties of regional school districts the authority to 
incur debt "for the purpose of constructing sewerage systems and 
sewerage treatment and disposal facilities, or for the purchase or use 
of such systems with municipalities."3 
Section 34C was repealed. This law had authorized the granting of 
high school diplomas to certain students who entered the armed services 
of the United States.4 
Section 38 was amended to authorize school committees to hire "in-
structional or administrative aides" for assignments in laboratories and 
classrooms. An instructional or administrative aide is defined as "a per-
son who does no actual teaching, but acts as an assistant to a teacher."5 
Section 38G was amended to add "teaching and administrative in-
terns from an institution of higher learning in the commonwealth" to 
those persons exempted from meeting the statutory certification re-
quirements, provided approval for the employment of such personnel 
is granted by the State Department of Education. A teaching or admin-
istrative intern is defined as "a student who has completed his practice 
teacher requirements and seeks additional experience in part time 
teaching or administrative positions."6 Section 38G was also amended 
to authorize the certification of a noncitizen, otherwise qualified, for 
the purpose of teaching "only the language of his country of origin," 
provided he was legally present in the United States and presents a 
declaration of his intention to become a United States citizen. Such 
certification is to be valid for six years and is not renewable. Service by 
these noncitizen teachers is not to be counted toward tenure status.7 
Section 38H was added to provide that every school librarian and 
school library supervisor or co-ordinator appointed by a school com-
mittee "shall acquire tenure in the school system of the city or town in 
which he is employed." The acquisition of this tenure is to be subject 
to the provisions of Section 41, which grants tenure upon re-election 
after service in a public school system for the three previous consecutive 
school years, and of Sections 42 and 43A, which relate to dismissal, sus-
pension and discharge, and appeals therefrom.s Section 41 also autho-
rizes a school committee to grant tenure to "a teacher who has served 
in its school for not less than one school year." 
Section 46 was amended to add a requirement that the school com-
3 Id., c. 367. 
4Id., c. 43. 
5Id., c. 164. 
6 Id., c. 172. 
7 Id., c. 345. 
SId., c. 276. 
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mittee shall have administered, annually, "an aptitude test" to every 
child under its control who is between the ages of seven and sixteen and 
"who has been ascertained to be mentally retarded."9 The determina-
tion as to a child's mental retardation is to be carried out under regula-
tions to be prescribed by the State Departments of Education and 
Mental Health. 
Section 69A was added to permit the placing on public school 
buildings, "in a conspicuous location," a plaque containing the words 
"For God and Country."10 
Section 71A was added to authorize school committees to designate 
locations for the erection of "highway safety stations" for children 
awaiting a school bus, provided each location has been approved by 
the school superintendent or, as his designee, the school transportation 
officer. A school committee is also authorized to discontinue the use of 
any such station if it is not constructed of "durable material with a floor 
of concrete raised above ground level," or if it is not kept clean, well 
painted, free of snow, and suitably maintained.l1 
Other sections of the General Laws were also amended in matters 
that pertain to education. Section 7 A of General Laws, Chapter 90, was 
amended to require the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to formulate and 
enforce rules and regulations providing for the inspection of "those 
school buses not subject to the jurisdiction of the department of public 
utilities," during the first week of the months of January, March, May, 
September, and November each year. This inspection is to be in addi-
tion to the previously required semiannual periodic inspection between 
April I-May 15 and between September I-October 15.12 
Section lOG was added to General Laws, Chapter 147, to permit the 
Commissioner of Public Safety, upon request, to appoint as special 
police officers employees of colleges, universities, or other educational 
institutions.13 
Section IIA of General Laws, Chapter 159A, was amended to place 
school service bus permits and operations under the supervision of the 
Department of Public Utilities and to permit the use of contract school 
buses in transporting pupils to and from school-sponsored extracur-
ricular activities.14 
Among other 1965 enactments relating to education generally were 
the following chapters of the Acts of 1965: Chapter 34 clarified the 
licensing of correspondence school salesmen; Chapter 132 related to 
the appointment of blind teachers; Chapter 171 provided that fra-
ternity houses and dormitories of educational institutions are to be 
subject to the laws regulating lodging houses; Chapter 244 regulated 
the passing by motor vehicles of certain "camp buses" which have 
9 Id., c. 221. 
10 Id., c. 502. 
11 Id., c. 404. 
12 Id., c. 71. 
13 Id., c. 565. 
14 Id., c. 537. 
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stopped on highways to pick up or discharge passengers; Chapter 610 
pertained to qualifications and training programs for food service per-
sonnel in public schools.11i 
Of interest to education generally, Chapters II and 50 of the Resolves 
of 1965 continued and increased the scope of the Special Commission 
to investigate relative to retarded children and training facilities there-
for. 
B. COURT DECISIONS 
§20.5. Bible reading in public schools. The petitioners sought a 
writ of mandamus, in Waite v. School Committee of Newton,! to com-
pel several school committees to comply with General Laws, Chapter 
71, Section 31, under which it was required that a "portion of the Bible 
shall be read daily in the public schools, without written note or oral 
comment." The Supreme Judicial Court in rescript referred to its 1964 
decision in Attorney General v. School Committee of North Brookfield2 
as controlling. In this earlier ruling the statute had been held unconsti-
tutional and void on the authority of School District of Abington 
Township v. Schempp,s in a decision of a single Justice, affirmed by 
the full Court.4 
§20.6. Determination of lowest bidder. In Builders Realty Corp. 
of Mass. v. City of Newton1 the city had publicly invited sealed pro-
posals for the construction of an addition to the Lincoln-Eliot School, 
in accordance with certain plans and specifications and subject to exist-
ing statutes.2 The invitation provided that proposals would be received 
until a specified time at the office of the city's purchasing agent, at 
which time the proposals would be publicly opened and read. The 
invitation also provided that the proposals be submitted in duplicate, 
with one copy to be deposited with the purchasing agent and the other 
with the comptroller of accounts. A document issued by the city, en-
titled "Information for Bidders," as well as a provision of the Newton 
revised ordinances, also stated that copies of bids should be submitted 
to the comptroller of accounts. 
Hi Special Acts were also enacted which involved particular aspects of educational 
operations in the following towns, cities, counties, regional school districts, and 
institutions of higher learning: Athol, c. 555; Attleboro, c. 147; Auburn, c. 82; Barre, 
c. 543; Blackstone Valley Vocational Regional, c. 144; Boston, cc. 182, 208, 215, 388, 
391; Boston University, c. 559; Bridgewater State College, c. 461; Danvers, c. 152; 
Dracut, cc. 2, 359; Dunsta,ble, c. 359; Fitchburg, c. 543;' Franklin, c. 161; Franklin 
County, c.555; Gardner, c. 543; Longmeadow, c. 139; Lowell, c. 359; Ludlow, c. 75; 
Monson, c. 614; Northbridge, c. 144; Norwood, cc. 15, 175; Pepperell, c. 359; Quincy, 
c. 372; Reading, c. 14; Royalson, c. 543; Somerville, cc. 126, 217; Springfield, c. 1I76; 
Sterling, c. 543; Tyngsborough, c. 1I59; University of Massachusetts, c. 388; Wilming-
ton, c. 89. 
§20.5. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1259, 202 N.E.2d 297. 
21147 Mass. 775, 199 N.E.2d 5511 (1964). 
s1I74 U.S. 203, 811 Sup. Ct. 1560, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844 (19611). 
41147 Mass. 775, 199 N.E.2d 553 (1964). 
§20.6. 1 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1191, 201 N.E.2d 825. 
2 G~., c. 149, §§44A-44L. 
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Prior to the time specified for the public opening of the bids, 
Builders Realty Corp. and Rocheford Construction Co., among others, 
had filed bids at the office of the purchasing agent. However, of the two 
mentioned bidders, only Rocheford had filed a copy of its bid with the 
comptroller of accounts. When the bids were opened, Builders' bid 
($237,343) was lowest, with Rocheford ($240,800) next. Both bids were 
in proper form and in all respects conformed to the applicable statutes, 
and both bidders were in all respects competent to perform the con-
tract. 
Three days after the opening of the bids, Builders Realty was notified 
that its bid had been rejected because no copy had been filed with the 
comptroller of accounts as required by ordinance and as stated in the 
bidding documents. Thereupon, Builders brought suit for a determina-
tion whether it or Rocheford was the lowest responsible and eligible 
bidder for the construction. Builders contended, primarily, that the 
requirements of the Newton ordinance were contrary to the provisions 
and intent of the applicable statutes.S 
Section 2.14 of the Newton ordinances provided: 
Whenever, in response to any advertisement under the preceding 
section [for a contract where the amount involved is $1000 or 
more] by any officer or board of the city, a bid ... is sent or de-
livered to the officer or board, a duplicate of the [bid] shall be fur-
nished by the bidder to the comptroller of accounts, to be kept by 
him and not opened until after the original bids are opened. After 
the original bids are opened, the comptroller of accounts shall 
open and examine the bids submitted to him, and shall compare 
the same with the original bids. In case [of discrepancies] those 
submitted to the comptroller of accounts shall be treated as the 
original bids. The contract shall not be awarded until after both 
sets of bids are opened. 
In holding that the city of Newton could properly reject Builders' 
bid, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court made the following 
significant comments: 
The purpose of the ordinance undoubtedly is to furnish a safe-
guard against collusion in the opening and reading of bids .... 
It does not follow, however, that that part of the ordinance should 
be upheld which, in the event of a difference between them, invali-
dates the original [bid] in favor of the copy. The original must be 
publicly opened under G.L. c. 149, §44F. The copy need not be 
publicly opened under ... the ordinances .... But, wholly apart 
from the ordinance ... there is no reason in the law of contracts 
why the city could not include in its offer to contract a require-
ment that a copy of a bid be filed with the comptroller of ac-
counts .... 
There is nothing illegal in the requirement. There is nothing in 
a Ibid. 
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G.L. c. 149, §§44A-44L, ... which limits to the statutory minimum 
the amount of reasonable protection which a unit [of government] 
may have .... We see no reason why [Builders Realty], which 
either did not carefully read the bidding documents or purposely 
disregarded this stipulation, should be helped in this equitable 
proceeding.4 
§20.7. Suit against school committee members: "Eliminated salary 
increase." In Powers v. Spinner1 the plaintiff, a teacher employed in 
the Westford public schools, brought suit against five members of the 
Westford School Committee, individually, to recover salary increases 
which the Committee had voted for 1963. A majority of the Committee 
- made up of the five members here being sued by Powers -later 
voted to "eliminate" from the school budget the funds necessary to pay 
the salary increases. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected Powers' conten-
tion with the comment: "We need not now consider what power the 
school committee possesses to rescind previously voted salary in-
creases."2 In substantiation, the Court cited earlier cases decided in 
1937, 1944, 1952, and 1961 which, it considered, had established this 
point. The Court also noted that a town, rather than the school com-
mittee or its individual members, would be liable for teachers' salaries 
which have been established by a nonrescinded vote of the school com-
mittee.s 
§20.8. Sick leave with pay: Entitlement. The plaintiff in Yankun 
v. City of Boston,! who had been employed by the city as an elementary 
schoolteacher since 1949, filed with the city's Superintendent of Schools 
in 1951 and 1954 a report "relative to [her] freedom from tuberculosis 
in a communicable form." In 1957, however, she filed no such report 
although, at that time, an existing statute required that every school-
teacher "at least every three years ... file ... a report, made by a regis-
tered physician, relative to his freedom from tuberculosis in a com-
municable form ... [together with] an X-ray .... "2 In case of question 
the statute provided for further X-rays and evaluation of them and 
went on to provide: "Cases in which the question of communicability 
of tuberculosis arises may on appeal be referred to a board of . . . 
physicians ... and their decision shall be final." 
In 1957 although Yankun did not file the required report, she did 
have chest X-rays taken from which a diagnosis of "pulmonary tubercu-
losis, minimal, questionably active" was made. She was given an ap-
41964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1191, 119!1-1194, 201 N.E.2d 825, 826·827. 
§20.7. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1261, 202 N.E.2d 246. 
2Id. at 1261-1262, 202 N.E.2d at 246. See G.L., c. 71, §4!1, prior to amendment by 
Acts of 196!1, c. 466, §4. 
8 G.L., c. 71, §38. 
§20.8. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1229,202 N.E.2d 25!1. 
2 G.L., c. 71, §55B, as it read on the applicable dates in 1957. 
9
Roach: Chapter 20: Education Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1965
§20.9 EDUCATION LAW 303 
pointment for a test to be given on June 25,1957, to determine activity, 
which she did not keep. Instead, she placed herself under the care of a 
private physician who advised her on June 24, 1957, to have no further 
contact with children because she had a communicable form of active 
pulmonary tuberculosis. 
From June 24, 1957, until April 28, 1958, she remained at home 
under treatment of the private physician who, on three separate oc· 
casions during this period of convalescence notified Yankun's school 
Principal by letter that she was unable to work because of illness, the 
nature of which he did not disclose. The Principal, whom Yankun 
had orally informed that she had communicable tuberculosis, trans-
mitted the physician's letters to the Superintendent of Schools but did 
not inform the latter of the nature of Yankun's illness. On May 1, 1958, 
after being certified free from communicable tuberculosis, Yankun reo 
turned to work as a teacher. 
During her absence, she had received sick leave pay, with 1/400 of 
her annual salary being deducted for each day of absence. But upon 
learning that the applicable statute provided, in her case, for sick leave 
with pay, Yankun, on May 25, 1961, asserted her claim for back wages. 
This claim was approved by the School Committee. Upon the refusal 
of the city to pay the claim, Yankun brought suit. From a Superior 
Court decree which in effect disallowed her claim, she appealed to the 
Supreme Judicial Court. 
In affirming the lower court decree, the Supreme Judicial Court 
found that the plaintiff did not comply with the conditions of the 
statute, in failing to file, as was her statutory duty, the report and X-
rays. The certification form did read so as to indicate that the person 
certified is free from tuberculosis but it would be a simple matter for 
the certifying physician to make the alterations necessary to indicate 
the reverse. As the plaintiff had ceased her work on her own volition 
and later returned to it without using the statutorily prescribed certifi· 
cation, the city had no notice other than that she was absent on sick 
leave, she received pay accordingly, and her failure to comply with 
General Laws, Chapter 71, Section 55B, relieved the city of its liability 
under the section. 
The Court refused to decide if Section 55B was unconstitutional, as 
had been held in the Superior Court below. Since the plaintiff was not 
entitled to recover for failure to comply with the statute, the consti-
tutional issues were properly avoided. 
§20.9. Dismissal of superintendent. On May 16, 1961, Sullivan 
was elected Superintendent of Schools by the Revere School Committee. 
By contract, dated July 10, 1961, the Committee engaged Sullivan, as 
superintendent, for a term of three years from August 1, 1961. By vote, 
on November 13, 1962, the School Committee then in office terminated 
the contract and, by written notice prior to April 15, 1963, notified 
Sullivan that he was not to be employed for the following school year. 
Thereupon, Sullivan brought the present action, Sullivan V. School 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1965 [1965], Art. 23
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1965/iss1/23
304 1965 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §20.10 
Committee of Revere,1 to determine the validity of the three-year con-
tract of July, 1961. 
The Superior Court decree declared that the contract was validly 
terminated by the November, 1962, vote of the Committee and by their 
written notice before April 15, 1963. Since, therefore, Sullivan was not 
serving at the discretion of the Committee under General Laws, Chap-
ter 71, Section 41, i.e., was not on tenure, he was subject to dismissal 
without cause. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed this 
ruling. 
In its opinion, the Court first noted that existing statutes specified 
that the school committee of a town not in a superintendency union or 
district shall employ a superintendent of schools and fix his compensa-
tion,2 and the school committee "shall elect a superintendent of schools 
annually, except as provided in section forty-one of chapter seventy-
one."s The exception of Section 41 of General Laws, Chapter 71, pro-
vides, inter alia, that a superintendent not serving at discretion is to be 
notified in writing on or before April 15 if he is not to be employed for 
the following school year. Absent this notice, he is, in effect, appointed 
for the following school year. 
The Court stated that these statutes clearly specified the term for 
which a superintendent not under tenure is engaged. The fact that one 
might argue that different powers in a school committee would insure 
better schools is not pertinent. Sullivan had argued that the statutory 
provision requiring the annual election of a superintendent who was 
not under tenure' should be considered as only a minimal requirement 
and that under its grant of the general charge of the public schools,1i a 
school committee could be justified in employing a superintendent un-
der a three-year contract. The Court held that the grant to the com-
mittee of the general charge of all the public schools did not lessen the 
significance of a legislative specification relating to the committee's 
employing power. 
The Court also stressed that the legislature has determined that 
supremacy relating to the continued employment of a superintendent 
is, except as to tenure, in the committee in office. The committee is not 
to be controlled by the action of a past committee except to the limited 
extent the statutes prescribe. 
§20.10. School election irregularities. Abbene, one of the twelve 
candidates contesting for six positions on the Revere School Committee, 
sued to compel the city Board of Election Commissioners to certify his 
election to the School Committee.l He alleged certain irregularities in 
the election held on November 5, 1963. 
§20.9. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1817,202 N.E.2d 612. 
2 G.L., c. 71, §59. 
8 Id., c. 48, §82. 
, Ibid. 
Ii Id., c. 71, §87. 
§20.IO. lAbbene v. Board of Election Commissioners of Revere, 1964 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1411, 202 N.E.2d 827. 
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Testimony in the Superior COl,lrt established that, at the close of the 
election, the Board made a return that Abbene, with a total vote of 
4657, had run seventh in the field of twelve and thus was not elected 
and that Moschella, another of the candidates, had received a total vote 
of 4685 and was thereby elected as the sixth member of the School 
Committee. After a recount, requested by Abbene, the tally was re-
ported as 4671 to 4637 in favor of Moschella. During the recount, 
workers on behalf of Abbene challenged and protested 39 ballots and 
"questioned" 56 other ballots which were subsequently (during the re-
count) protested by Abbene. The 39 ballots originally protested were 
enclosed in an envelope by the Election Commissioners and sealed, and 
the other 56 protested ballots were placed in a separate envelope and 
sealed. 
In its opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court first noted that while 
neither of the two envelopes containing the protested ballots contained 
the required certification by the Board of Election Commissioners that 
it contained all ballots that had been protested,2 all of the protested 
ballots were actually in the envelopes. The Court noted also that the 
lower court had found fraud in the marking of 24 ballots from the first 
envelope, and in the marking of 33 ballots from the second envelope, 
and that pursuant to these findings, the corrected totals should read 
4642 for Abbene against 4619 for Moschella. The Court held that 
their own examination of the questioned ballots revealed that there was 
a basis for the finding that they were fraudulently marked. Although 
there was a failure to comply strictly with the certification provision of 
the statute, the objective of the statute was satisfied by the substantial 
if not exact compliance.s 
The Court rejected the argument that the use of the word "shall" 
in the statute imposed the requirement of strict compliance with the 
prescribed formalities; the facts of the present case constituted sufficient 
compliance with the statute. The Court then quoted Judge Learned 
Hand: "[It] is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed 
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to re-
member that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, 
whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to 
their meaning."4 Thereupon, the Board of Election Commissioners was 
ordered to certify that Abbene was elected to the School Committee. 
§20.11. Award of milk contract. The Holyoke School Committee, 
in advertising for written bids to supply milk during the 1964-1965 
school year, reserved the right to reject any bids. Gosselin's Dairy, Inc., 
which had its principal office in Chicopee, submitted a bid estimated 
to cost the city $65,650. However, the award was made to a Holyoke 
firm which had submitted a bid of $67,210. A Superior Court ruling 
2 G.L., c. 54, §135, requiring that all protested ballots should be placed by election 
officials in a separate sealed envelope, who then shall certify that the envelope 
contains all protested ballots. 
S See note 2 supra. 
f Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945). 
12
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1965 [1965], Art. 23
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1965/iss1/23
306 1965 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSEITS LAW §20.12 
had dismissed Gosselin's request for a review of the School Committee's 
action. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Gosselin's Dairy, Inc. v. School Committee of Holyoke.1 
In its opinion, the Court commented that the sole question was 
whether the award had to be made to the lowest responsible and eligi-
ble bidder under General Laws, Chapter 30, Section 39M, requiring 
that "all contracts for construction and materials be awarded to the 
lowest and responsible bidder." The Court found that in context, Sec-
tion 39M, in defining "material," had to be interpreted as referring 
only to materials used in the construction, alteration, or repair of any 
public work as the section is principally devoted to public works con-
struction. The milk contract was, therefore, governed by General Laws, 
Chapter 40, Section 4B, which refers to contracts "for the purchase of 
equipment, supplies or materials" and does not require award to the 
lowest responsible bidder. Gosselin's arguments, that the public in-
terest required a lowest responsible bidder provision for purchases of 
supplies such as milk, were properly addressed to the legislature, not 
the judiciary. Thereupon, the lower court judgment was affirmed. 
§20.12. School civil service position: Abolition. On February 5, 
1962, the Salem School Committee effected a reorganization of the sys-
tem's school lunch program that excluded the position of senior ac-
count clerk then held by Mrs. Catherine Hughes. After a hearing and 
review, as was provided by statute,l and which had been requested by 
Mrs. Hughes, the Civil Service Commission on April 25, 1962, accepted 
the report of the hearing officer that the School Committee's action was 
not justified, and reversed the action. 
The School Committee, in School Committee of Salem v. Civil 
Service Commission,2 sought judicial review of the Commission deter-
mination. The denial by the Superior Court of this writ of certiorari 
was reversed by the Supreme Judicial Court, thus, in effect, affirming 
the action of the School Committee. The Supreme Judicial Court 
found: 
The evidence before the hearing officer was insufficient to warrant 
his conclusion that the school committee's action was unjustified . 
. . . His finding is, in essence, based on his disagreement with the 
committee's judgment that a reorganization which included the 
abolition of the position [of senior account clerk] would promote 
efficiency and economy. 
Such a decision, however, was for the school committee. [The 
statute]3 does not substitute the Civil Service Commission for the 
school committee in the operation of the school department. 
The school lunch program is a school committee function .... 
The record shows that the committee exercised its best judgment. 
§20.11. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 473, 205 N.E.2d 221. 
§20.l2. 1 G.L.. c. 31, §43(b). 
2 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 477, 205 N.E.2d 707. 
S G.L., c. 31, §43. 
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It shows that, after deliberation, the school committee effected a 
reorganization that excluded Mrs. Hughes' position. That reor-
ganization justified the abolition of the position.4 
The Court held that no basis for overriding the School Committee's 
decision appeared, therefore, and further held that the suit was prop-
erly not dismissed for mootness. 
§20.13. Rejection of general bids: Invalidity of sub-bids. After 
the issuance of properly prepared invitations for general bids and sub-
bids for a school addition, the Wayland School Building Committee 
received nine general bids. The two lowest were those submitted by 
Alexau.der Associates, Inc. ($299,400), and by Cardarelli Construction 
Co. ($299,230). Each general bidder used the bids of the same sub-
bidders except for the electrical work. Alexander used the sub-bid of 
the Power Electrical Co. of $22,000 and Cardarelli used that of Guertin 
Co. of $22,490. 
Subsequently, Cardarelli protested the Alexander bid as violative of 
existing statutory bidding laws and procedures,l on the grounds that 
while the Alexander bid included in it the sub-bid of Power Electrical 
Co., the Power sub-bid, as submitted, had specifically restricted its bid 
to the "Patten Construction Co., Inc. - Only."2 
Thereupon, in Wayland School Building Committee v. Cardarelli 
Construction Co.,s the Committee sought a judicial determination as to 
whether the Alexander bid violated the bidding laws and procedures 
and whether the general contract should be awarded to Alexander or 
Cardarelli. The Superior Court ruling, to the effect that the Alexander 
bid was not invalid, was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court. Its 
opinion referred to the lower court findings and rulings as comprising 
"a full and accurate treatment of the issues." Included in those findings 
and rulings were the following significant comments: 
1. "[There] may be situations where a sub-bidder may not want for 
adequate reasons to contract with any of the general contractors but 
one. There appears to be no law to prevent him from submitting a bid 
limited to one general contractor. It is his offer and he may contract 
with whomsoever he pleases." 
2. "[The pertinent] statute is framed to have the general contractor 
with whom a sub-bidder does not wish to do business excluded by 
name. The legislative intent is plain ... from the [statute]."4 [Emphasis 
added.] 
3. "The legislature has set up in the statute the test to determine 
whether the awarding authority has the power to invalidate or reject a 
general bid based on claimed defective sub-bids." 
4. "[The] legislature has emphasized its intent that general contrac-
41965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 477, 478-479, 205 N.E.2d 707, 709-710. 
§20.l3. 1 G.L., c. 149, §§44A-44L. 
2 Patten was one of the other seven general bidders. 
31965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 962, 208 N.E.2d 228. 
4 G.L .• c. 149. §44H. 
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tors to be precluded from using a .sub-bid ... must be named as general 
bidders expressly excluded. If a general bidder is excluded by words of 
indirection and not explicitly by name ... his general bid shall not be 
held invalid or rejected .... "11 
5. "[The] construction of the disputed clause in the Power bid is not 
an express exclusion by name of Alexander ... as a general bidder." 
6. "Furthermore, the determination of the invalidity of a sub-bid 
will not invalidate the general bid .... [The] Wayland School Building 
Committee can not reject the general bid of ... Alexander ... because 
of an invalidity of the Power sub-bid .... " 
The opinion concluded with the comment that the Court could not 
grant the petition of the School Building Committee for a judgment 
"whether the contract should be awarded to Alexander or Cardarelli, as 
was sought by the committee in this suit, as the competence of bidders 
is to be determined under the statute by the awarding authority and 
not by the Court." 
§20.14. 1961 school committee vote: Effect on 1962 committee. In 
early December, 1961, and prior to the submission of the estimated 1962 
school budget, the Springfield School Committee voted to increase the 
salaries of teachers and various other school employees. On December 
26,1961, the Committee presented an estimated budget which, in effect, 
totaled $11,846,099. On January 1, 1962, a new School Committee was 
elected. Seven members of the 1961 Committee were no longer members 
of the new Committee. Later, in January, the 1962 School Committee 
voted to reduce (or rescind) the salary increases which had been voted 
by the 1961 Committee in an amount totaling $223,890. This reduced 
figure was the amount put into the 1962 city budget in April, 1962. 
Thereupon, in Hilliker v. City of Springfield l a ten-taxable-inhab-
itants' suit was brought in the Superior Court2 against the city, alleg-
ing that the amounts necessary for the support of the city's schools for 
the year 1962 were not included in the city's annual budget. The lower 
court in effect held that: (1) the members of the 1962 School Committee 
were not bound by the action of the 1961 Committee, and hence could 
make changes in the estimates submitted by the 1961 Committee; and 
(2) the salary schedules voted in December by the 1961 Committee to 
take effect nine months later did not constitute a contract with the 
teachers which could not be "impaired" by the 1962 Committee vote to 
reduce (or rescind) the salary increases. 
In affirming the lower court judgment, the Supreme Judicial Court 
noted first that it was the contention of Hilliker that: (1) the estimate 
of expenditures presented by the 1961 Committee was "the only re-
quired estimate"; and (2) therefore, under existing lawS the city was 
II '1:he clause in the Power sub-bid had specifically restricted its bid to the 
"Patten Construction Co., Inc. - Only" but had not mentioned Alexander by name. 
§20.14. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 951, 200 N.E.2d 895. 
2 Under G.L., c. 71, §54. 
8 Ibid. 
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required to appropriate funds for the salary increases appearing in this 
estimate. 
Then the Court made the following noteworthy comments: 
That the power to determine teachers' salaries is vested solely 
and absolutely in the school committee is not to be doubted .... 
In making this determination, the school committee was not re-
quired to submit a budget, including estimated salaries, in 1961. 
The time limits provided in G.L., c. 44, §31A [between November 
1 and December 1] do not apply to school committees .... The esti-
mated budget need only be seasonably submitted with reference to 
the date on which the budget is presented to the city council. ... 
We, therefore, are of opinion that the 1962 committee had au-
thority to establish new salary schedules, thereby reducing the 
amount which the city was obligated to appropriate .... 4 
The Court also rejected the argument that the 1962 School Commit-
tee abused its authority in making salary deductions in the interest of 
the financial well-being of the city of Springfield. Even if it were as-
sumed that this was the Committee's purpose, the evidence did not 
establish that the Committee failed to consider the welfare of the 
schools. 
§20.15. Racial census in public schools. On March 2, 1964, the 
State Commissioner of Education, in a letter to all chairmen of school 
committees and superintendents of schools in Massachusetts, referred to 
current problems concerning the racial composition of the student bod-
ies in th.e public schools of the Commonwealth. He also enclosed school 
census forms to be returned before April 1, 1964, together with instruc-
tions. The forms asked for the total number of "white" and "non-
white" students in each school. 
On March 16, the New Bedford School Committee's secretary (the 
Superintendent of Schools) notified the Commissioner by letter that the 
Committee had voted to take no action on the March 2 letter. The 
Commissioner repeated his request for compliance on March 23 and on 
May 1. On May 11, a letter from the New Bedford Superintendent of 
Schools informed the Commissioner that the Committee had voted that 
he be told that, if he wanted a census, he or his delegate "should come 
to New Bedford and conduct the census." 
On June 12, 1964, in New Bedford School Committee v. Commis-
sioner of Educationl the Committee and others brought a bill against 
the Commissioner and the State Board of Education for a declaration 
that: (1) the School Committee was not required to conduct the racial 
census; and (2) the state authorities could not, as a result of the failure 
to take such census, withhold any school aid to which New Bedford 
was entitled.2 
41965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 951,954,207 N.E.2d 895, 897-898. 
§20.l5. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1029, 208 N.E.2d 814. 
2G.L., c. 70. 
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The Superior Court decree, which sustained the objections of. t~e 
state authorities to the suit, was appealed to the Supreme JudIcIal 
Court on the grounds, primarily, that: (I) the state authorities had not 
furnished any criterion by which to conduct a racial census; (2) the 
racial composition of the New Bedford schools "does not lend itself to 
the drawing of a ... realistic distinction between 'white' and 'non-
white' students"; and (3) the proposed racial census "could serve no 
useful educational purpose." 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the lower court decree and 
returned the case to that court for a further hearing on its merits. In 
so doing the Court made the following statements because they would, 
being brief statements of the applicable law, facilitate ready determina-
tion of the dispute. 
[W]e think that, in the aggregate, the statutory provisions3 au-
thorize the commissioner, acting reasonably, to compel the produc-
tion of information of the general character now sought .... 
The statutes (especially c. 72, §3) sufficiently express a legislative 
intention that the commissioner shall have power to compel the 
production of reasonable information by the cities and towns rel-
evant to education in the cities and towns and to pending educa-
tional problems of the department .... 
The census form [here involved] however, contained no space for 
a jurat. No requirement of an oath was indicated .... Conse-
quently, we assume that the commissioner was not asking for in-
clusion of the census material in the annual return .... 4 
We have no doubt (a) that the commissioner has power to re-
quire relevant, unsworn information, reasonably required by him, 
to be filed by local school authorities separately from the annual 
return, or (b) that the production of such separate information 
may be enforced by mandamus .... We would not regard such 
separate, unsworn information, however, as part of the annual 
return, at least in the absence of a clear direction by the commis-
sioner that it be included in the return .... 
The provisions for withholding State aid ... because of a city's 
failure to file "the returns and the report required by law" ... 
appear to refer to the annual report of the school committee 
( ... required to be filed with the commissioner each year by April 
30) and to the formal returns (and additional material) called for 
by [law]. ... 5 If, at the hearing on the merits, the racial census is 
found not to have been required as a part of the formal annual 
returns ... the [withholding of State aid] cannot be applied to the 
city for failure to file the census reports .... 
[The terms "white" and "non-white"] seem to us reasonably 
susceptible of application by school superintendents and teachers 
8 G.L., c. 69, §l; id., c. 70, §§3, 4, 9; id., c. 72, §§2, 3. 
4 Id., c. 72, §3. 
5Id. §§3-6. 
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for the present general purposes. We need not now consider any 
difficulties inherent in applying these terms as to individuals, cov-
ered by such a census, for other purposes. 
The classification is one which the courts and the bureau of the 
census have found it practical to apply in New Bedford and else-
where .... Reasonable accuracy should be possible for a school 
committee, school officers, and teachers who are not reluctant to 
cooperate with the commissioner by furnishing him with informa-
tion to which he is entitled by statute. The correspondence [in this 
case] strongly suggests such reluctance on the part of the school 
committee .... 
The relevance of the information sought cannot reasonably be 
questioned. We take judicial notice of the fact that controversial 
racial problems currently affect the administration of public 
schools, even in Massachusetts, and that information about the 
racial composition of student bodies may be of value to the [edu-
cation] department's work .... The solution of these problems 
doubtless will be assisted by the dispassionate consideration of all 
relevant facts, some of which can be obtained only from local 
school authorities.6 
§20.16. Racial segregation in public schools. In Barksdale v. 
Springfield School Committee,! parents of Negro children residing in 
Springfield brought suit for a judicial declaration that the Committee 
and its Superintendent of Schools, by assigning the children to racially 
segregated schools in that city, were illegally denying such children 
their rights under the Federal Constitution. The thirty-eight elemen-
tary and eight junior high schools in the Springfield system were organ-
ized on the "neighborhood plan" under which children were required 
to attend the school within the district in which they lived.2 Some of 
the elementary and junior high schools had a heavy concentration of 
Negro children. Approximately 82 per cent of the system's Negro ele-
mentary-grade children were enrolled in eight of the thirty-eight ele-
mentary schools; in these eight schools, the percentage of Negro enroll-
ment was 20, 46, 48, 55, 59, 75, 85, and 90 respectively. Approximately 
86 per cent of the Negro junior high school children were in two of the 
eight junior high schools; in these two schools, the Negro enrollment 
percentages were 15 and 63. 
In its opinion, the district court noted first that the plaintiffs were 
contending (I) that the racial imbalance in some of the Springfield 
schools was segregation in the constitutional sense and within the 1954 
decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka;8 (2) that continued adherence to the "neighborhood policy," 
by the Springfield school authorities, was tantamount to a law compel-
61965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1029, 1032·1035, 208 N.E.2d 814, 817-819. 
§20.16. 1237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965), also noted in §1I.7 supra_ 
2 The city's four senior high schools were not involved in this suit. 
8847 U.s. 488, 74 Sup. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 878 (1954). 
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ling segregation; and (3) that the school authorities had deliberately 
drawn district lines and assigned pupils so as to segregate them by race. 
The court also noted (1) that the School Committee, after recogniz. 
ing in September, 1963, "that integrated education is desirable," had 
resolved to take action to eliminate racial concentration in the schools 
to the fullest extent possible and to have plans prepared by March, 
1964, to solve the problem, but had discontinued the planning await· 
ing the outcome of the present litigation; (2) that neighborhood school 
district lines had been drawn in conformity with accepted criteria 
(school location and capacity; the safety and convenience of the chilo 
dren) and not in order to segregate children by race; (3) that those 
schools in which the vast majority of Negro students were enrolled con· 
sistently ranked lowest in achievement ratings; and (4) that special 
school programs for gifted children had few, and sometimes no, Negro 
participants. 
The issue in this case, the court said, was not whether there is a 
constitutional mandate to remedy racial imbalance - the Springfield 
school authorities argued there was not - but whether there is a con· 
stitutional duty to provide equal educational opportunities for all 
children within the system. The court observed that "racially imbal· 
anced schools are not conducive to learning, that is, to retention, per· 
formance, and the development of creativity. Racial concentration in 
his school communicates to the negro child that he is different and is 
expected to be different from white children."4 
The court also decided that, while there was no deliberate intent of 
the school authorities to segregate the races, segregation in the sense of 
racial imbalance existed largely because of a rigid adherence to the 
neighborhood plan. The court considered it unnecessary to define the 
term racial imbalance, but found, in the light of the ratio of white to 
nonwhite in the total population in the city of Springfield, a nonwhite 
enrollment of appreciably more than 50 per cent in anyone school is 
tantamount to segregation. II The court continued: 
Therefore, even if all schools are equal in physical plant, facil· 
ities, and ability and number of teachers, and even if academic 
achievement were at the same level at all schools, the opportunity 
of negro children in racially concentrated schools to obtain equal 
educational opportunities is impaired. . .. 
It is neither just nor sensible to proscribe segregation having its 
basis in affirmative state action [as in Brown] while at the same 
time failing to provide a remedy for segregation which grows out 
of discrimination in housing, or other economic or social factors. 
Education is tax supported and compulsory, and public school 
educators, therefore, must deal with inadequacies within the educa. 
4237 F. Supp. 543, 546 (D. Mass. 1965). 
II The total elementary school enrollment for 1963·1964 was 80.3 per cent Negro 
and 2.3 per cent Puerto Rican. Puerto Ricans were not involved in the suit and 
were disregarded because of their small numbers. 
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tional system as they arise, and it matters not that the inadequacies 
are not of their making. This is not to imply that the neighbor-
hood school policy per se is unconstitutional, but that it must be 
abandoned or modified when it results in segregation in fact .... 
In view of the disparity of population and school a1:tendance, there 
cannot be equal representation of white and negro students in each 
school, but there must be no segregated schools.6 
Therewith, the Springfield school authorities were ordered to present 
a plan to the court by April 30, 1965, to eliminate to the fullest extent 
possible racial concentration in the Springfield schools within the 
framework of effective educational procedures, as guaranteed by the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 
The decision of the district court was reversed on appeal, and the 
vacated order was remanded with directions to dismiss without preju-
dice to the plaintiffs' right to institute a new action in the event of 
changed circumstances. The First Circuit opinion, by Chief Judge 
Aldrich, stated: 
[A]s we read it, through all of its opinion prior to the order the 
[district] court appears to hold that the plaintiffs have a constitu-
tional right to the abolition of racial imbalance to preserve their 
equal educational rights, but its order is restricted to reduction 
only so far as feasible within the framework of effective educational 
procedures. 
The difference between the court's order ... and the seeming 
absolutism of its opinion unilluminated by its order, is substantial. 
"Effective educational procedures" involve many factors, and must 
concern all students .... [T]he very correction of racial imbalance 
may have adverse effects upon the educational environment. 
Certain statements in the [district court] opinion, notably that 
"there must be no segregated schools," suggest an absolute right in 
the plaintiffs to have what the court found to be "tantamount to 
segregation" removed at all costs. We can accept no such constitu-
tional right .... [W]hen the goal is to equalize educational oppor-
tunity for all students, it would be no better to consider the Ne-
gro's special interests exclusively than it would be to disregard 
them completely .... 
[R]acial imbalance disadvantages Negro students and impairs 
their educational opportunities as compared with other races to 
such a degree that they have a right to insist that the [school au-
thorities] consider their special problems along with all other 
relevant factors when making administrative decisions .... Thus 
when suit was instituted, in January 1964, the school authorities 
6237 F. Supp. 543, 546-547 (D. Mass. 1965). 
7 This is similar terminology to that used in the 1963 Springfield School Com-
mittee resolution, which recognized that "integrated education is desirable" and 
resolved to eliminate "racial concentration" in its schools. 
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had already recognized ... what the [district] court's order later 
commanded.8 
The district court had noted that, in September, 1963, the Spring-
field School Committee had resolved to take action necessary to elimi-
nate racial concentration in the schools within the framework of effective 
educational procedures. It had, accordingly, voted to develop proposals 
designed to solve the problem, which were being held in abeyance 
during the pendency of the law suit. The Court of Appeals held that 
the plaintiffs needed no remedy since the School Committee and au-
thorities could complete their plan and it may meet federal constitu-
tional standards. No court order was therefore now required. But if 
the school authorities "permanently disregard their previously an-
nounced purpose to reduce imbalance so far as educationally feasible, 
a new action may be brought to determine whether the plaintiffs are, 
in that event, entitled to relief."9 
The court further considered whether the School Committee vote of 
September, 1963, to eliminate racial concentration in the schools was 
itself unconstitutional since it involved classification by race. The court 
stated: 
The . . . proposed action does not concern race except insofar as 
race correlates with proven deprivation of educational opportu-
nity .... It would seem no more unconstitutional to take into ac-
count plaintiffs' special characteristics and circumstances that have 
been found to be occasioned by their color than it would be to 
give special attention to physiological, psychological or sociolog-
ical variances from the norm occasioned by other factors. That 
these differences happen to be associated with a particular race is 
no reason for ignoring them.10 
c. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
§20.17. General. The following opinions issued by the Attorney 
General between September 1, 1964, and August 31, 1965, are of im-
portance to education generally, in terms of the chapters of the General 
Laws noted. 
§20.18. "Open-meeting" law and state boards. Under General 
Laws, Chapter 30A, Section llA, may the trustees of the University of 
Massachusetts select the site of a new medical school by way of a secret 
ballot? (Question raised by the Governor.) 
Under the Attorney General's opinion, dated July 19, 1965, they may. 
The opinion also held: (I) "The 'open-meeting law' requires that the 
meeting itself must ... be conducted in public ... except when certain 
specified situations occur, at which times the [trustees] may vote to 
proceed in executive session." (2) "But nothing appears in the law 
8 Springfield School Committee v. Barksdale, B48 F.2d 261, 263-264 (1st Cir. 1965). 
9Id. at 266. 
10 Ibid. 
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which would obligate each individual trustee to reveal how he voted, 
or which would require the ... records to contain the same, and the 
[trustees] could lawfully exercise discretion to withhold such informa-
tion." (3) Contrariwise, the "open-meeting law" applicable to munici-
palities, General Laws, Chapter 39, Section 23A, does contain an ex-
press prohibition against the use of secret ballots.1 
§20.19. Civil service. Under General Laws, Chapter 31, is the new 
position of "Education Information Officer," authorized for the Depart-
ment of Education for the fiscal year 1965, subject to the civil service 
law and rules? (Question raised by the Commissioner of Education.) 
By opinion dated January 21, 1965, the Attorney General stated that, 
since the position and duties of the Education Information Officer are 
clearly related to "the promulgation of information dealing with better 
teaching methods as well as information pertaining to the present 
school or college level;" the new position is not subject to civil service 
law and rules. 
§20.20. Support of public schools. Under General Laws, Chapter 
40, Section 5(34), must expenditures for out-of-state travel by school 
committee members be provided by cities and towns whether or not the 
expenditures were authorized by the board of selectmen or other town 
or municipal executive heads? (Question raised by the Commissioner 
of Education.) 
Such expenditures must be provided, according to the Attorney 
General's opinion dated July 8, 1965. "The fiscal independence of 
school committees is well established. To derogate from this fiscal inde-
pendence, a clear indication of legislative intent is necessary. Absent 
such indication, G.L., c. 71, §34, continues to give to school committees 
power to require the appropriation of funds covering those expendi-
tures for out-of-state travel that are 'reasonably deemed by the commit-
tee to bear a relation to its statutory mandate' [to exercise general 
charge of the schools]."l 
§20.21. Indemnification of teachers. Under General Laws, Chap-
ter 41, Section lOOC, can insurance be taken out by a school committee 
for its employees or is it limited to a cash settlement of a claim or judg-
ment? (This and subsequent questions in this section raised by the 
Commissioner of Education.) The Attorney General held, in his opin-
ion dated February 25, 1965, answering the Commissioner's various 
questions, that school committees may, if they wish, take out insurance 
to indemnify their employees. 
What action can be taken against a school committee which, after 
finding that the act which resulted in a judgment against one of its 
teachers was committed while the latter was acting as a teacher, fails 
to place in its budget the amount necessary to pay for the expenses or 
§20.l8. 1 See also G.L., c. 39, §23A, concerning the "open-meeting" law and 
m unici pali ties. 
§20.20. 1 The opinion is also of relevance to G.L., c. 71, §34, relating to support 
of public schools. 
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damages sustained by the teacher? The Attorney General stated that, 
irrespective of whether the school committee has appropriated funds in 
anticipation of the judgment, such a judgment, like any other judg-
ment against a town, may be filed with the board of selectmen and 
thereafter the assessors must see to the appropriation of funds to sat-
isfy it. 
Will an action by ten taxable inhabitants lie, under General Laws, 
Chapter 71, Section 34, to compel the town to place the amount of the 
claim in the budget? In the Attorney General's opinion, yes. The peti-
tion of ten taxable inhabitants may be applied to place the claim in 
the budget. Funds for indemnification of teachers fall within the lan-
guage of General Laws, Chapter 71, Section 34, providing for the sup-
port of public schools and "are to be dealt with in the same manner as 
funds for general school purposes." 
Is a school committee prohibited from putting funds in its budget to 
pay the legal costs of a libel suit which involves one of its teachers? The 
Attorney General stated: "A libel suit falls within the provision for 
'any other acts done' by a teacher which is included in G.L., c. 41, 
§lOOC." Hence, a libel suit judgment could be paid out of funds appro-
priated by the school committee in pursuance of Section lOOC, subject 
to the further provision that the act which resulted in the judgment 
was accomplished in the scope of the teacher's employment.1 
§20.22. School aid. Under General Laws, Chapter 70, Section 1, 
are the minors who reside on the federal installation at Westover Air 
Force Base, Chicopee, to be included within the geographical limits of 
Chicopee for purposes of state aid to public schools? (Question raised 
by the Commissioner of Education.) 
Yes, stated the Attorney General in an opinion dated July 8, 1965, 
since the expressed purposes of General Laws, Chapter 70, Section 1, 
are to promote the equalization of (1) "educational opportunity in 
public schools of the Commonwealth"; and (2) "the burden of the 
costs of schools to the respective towns." 
The opinion also held: (1) The first purpose of Section 1 "will be 
fulfilled by the fact that reimbursement to Chicopee for the costs of the 
education of the [Westover] pupils will increase the total amounts 
available for education in Chicopee and thus improve the educational 
opportunities available to all Chicopee public school pupils"; and (2) 
"Failure to consider the school pupils who reside on the military reser-
vation increases the burden on local taxpayers and is contrary to the 
[second purpose of Section 1] that the local burdens be equalized by 
state reimbursement of part of the per pupil cost of instruction." 
§20.23. State aid for public schools. Under General Laws, Chap-
ter 70, Section 3, may the Treasurer and Receiver General withhold 
money which would otherwise be payable to the city of New Bedford 
under General Laws, Chapter 70, Section 3, as a result of the certifica-
§20.21. 1 The opinion is of pertinence also to C.L., c. 71, §!l4, relating to sup. 
port of public schools. 
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tion by the Commissioner of Education that returns of that city have 
not been filed with his office in accordance with General Laws, Chapter 
72, Section 6? (Question raised by Treasurer. and Receiver General.) 
Under the Attorney General's opinion of April 29, 1965, the Treas-
urer is not authorized to distribute funds, pursuant to General Laws, 
Chapter 70, Section 3, "unless and until the Commissioner [advises] or 
a court of competent jurisdiction rules that the reports required under 
Chapter 72 have been filed with the Commissioner's office in accordance 
with applicable provisions of the General Laws. To date, no such'infor-
mation has been given or ruling issued." 
In a further question, is the effect of the June 23, 1965, Supreme 
Judicial Court decision in School Committee of New Bedford v. Com-
missioner of Education1 such as to permit the State Treasurer to release 
some $600,000 in school aid funds which he had withheld from the city 
of New Bedford, on the strength of the April 29, 1965, opinion of the 
Attorney General (above), which opinion had been rendered following 
the refusal of New Bedford to comply with a directive of the Depart-
ment of Education that the city conduct a racial census in its school and 
report its findings to the Commissioner? (Question raised by the Trea-
surer and Receiver General.) 
The Attorney General held, in opinion of July 9, 1965: 
There is at this time no judicial order on record which would com-
pel either retention or immediate release of the [funds] in question. 
Should the Commissioner [of Education] determine that the racial 
census report is a part of the annual return [General Laws, Chap-
ter 72, Section 3], and that such a report has not been filed, he may 
order that [the funds] still be withheld. If, on the other hand, the 
Commissioner concludes that the racial census report is not a part 
of the annual return - or if such a conclusion is arrived at after 
a hearing upon the merits ... - then the funds must be released 
and paid over to the City of New Bedford. 
The opinion also held: (1) "The legal situation with respect to the 
funds currently held in the Treasury is - for all practical purposes-
the same as it was prior to the commencement of litigation"; (2) The 
Court ruling "is based upon a procedural consideration only, although 
the Court does include extensive additional comments or 'dicta' ad-
dressed to the legality of the taking of a racial census as well as to the 
legality of the withholding of school aid amounts"; and (3) Among such 
"dicta" were Court conclusions that the Commissioner could lawfully 
require the taking of a racial census and that such information could 
be required as a part of, rather than separately from, the annual return 
required by General Laws, Chapter 72, Section 3. 
In view of the opinion of the Attorney General dated July 8, 1965,2 
§20.2!1. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1029, 208 N.E.2d 814, noted in §20.15 supra. 
2 See §20.22 supra. 
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should the city of Chicopee be granted additional state aid for past 
years? (Question raised by the Commissioner of Education.)S 
In an opinion dated August 4, 1965, the Attorney General held that, 
since the procedure as outlined in General Laws, Chapter 70, Section 
9, allows the Commissioner to certify the amount due to each commu-
nity "up to December 31, Chicopee should receive reimbursement for 
this past school year of 1964-1965. However, since Chapter 70 [Section 
3] is quite explicit in the procedure for the granting of this financial 
aid ... Chicopee should not be awarded a further lump sum payment 
for any earlier school year:'4 
The opinion also held: (I) "It is evident from [General Laws, Chap-
ter 70, Sections 3, 9; Chapter 72, Section 3] that the grant for each year 
is to be considered as a separate transaction .... There is no provision 
... that would authorize a disbursement ... which covered more than 
the single 'preceding school year: " 
§20.24. Reimbursement for pupil transportation. Under General 
Laws, Chapter 71, Section 7 A, must the town of Berkley, which has 
no high school and sends its high school students to a regional high 
school in the adjoining town of Dighton, and to which Berkley provides 
the transportation, provide transportation for high school students at-
tending approved parochial schools in the adjoining city of Taunton? 
(Question raised by Commissioner of Education.) 
In an opinion dated August 10, 1965, the Attorney General answered 
yes. "A school committee must provide transportation to an out-of-town 
private school for pupils in the same grades as pupils whom the school 
committee transports to an out-of-town public school." 
The opinion also held: (I) "[A] school committee is obligated to pro-
vide transportation for private school pupils to the same extent as for 
public school pupils even though the cost per capita may be greater for 
the private school pupils"; and (2) "[A]s a result of [General Laws, 
Chapter 71, Section 7A, which requires competitive bidding on pupil 
transportation contracts], a school committee could lose its right to 
state reimbursement if it seeks to discharge its obligation by paying a 
transportation allowance to the parents of school children instead of 
providing the actual transportation." 
§20.25. Massachusetts Executive Committee for Educational Tele-
vision. Under General Laws, Chapter 71, Sections 13F-13I, (I) is the 
Executive Committee for Educational Television independently au-
thorized to determine the rate structure for member systems, an operat-
ing budget sufficient to permit effective operation, and the number, 
qualifications, and reimbursement of its employees? (This and subse-
quent questions in this section raised by the Commissioner of Educa-
tion.) 
In his opinion of June 23, 1965, the Attorney General answered no. 
Determinations by the Committee in matters pertaining to educational 
8 See also G.L., c. 70, §l, relating to foundation program for school aid purposes. 
4 The opinion interrelates Sections g and 9 of G.L .• c. 70. 
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television are subject to the approval of the Department of Education. 
(2) Must secretarial or clerical employees of the Executive Committee 
be members of the civil service? Yes. 
(3) May the Committee carry on its own business transactions or must 
they be processed through other divisions of the state government? 
To the extent that the Committee expends monies received from 
school committees, organizations, or individuals and which are paid 
into the special Educational Television Program Fund, the Committee 
need not process its business transactions through other divisions of the 
state government, since it will not require a warrant and certification 
by the Comptroller, nor a vote by the Executive Council on the war-
rant. However, such warrant, certification, and Executive Council vote 
will be necessary for Committee expenditures from funds appropriated 
to it by the General Court. 
(4) Is the Committee free to pay personnel without regard to the 
civil service salary schedules contained in General Laws, Chapter 30, 
Sections 46, 46B? For any employee who falls within civil service classi-
fications, the Committee may not set a salary without reference to these 
sections of the statute. 
§20.26. Regional school districts. Under General Laws, Chapter 
71, Sections 14-161, (1) maya regional school district be organized for 
administrative purposes only - that is, with no construction contem-
plated at the time of its organization? (This and subsequent questions 
in this section raised by the Commissioner of Education.) 
By opinion dated July 20, 1965, the Attorney General stated that a 
regional school district cannot be organized for administrative purposes 
only. 
The opinion also held: (a) "Instituting an administrative reorganiza-
tion does not establish a regional school district. In order to create such 
a district the communities must comply in every respect with the pro-
visions of G.L. c. 71, §§I4-16I. ... " 
(b) "The fact ... that no construction is contemplated is a strong, 
if not overriding consideration, indicating a failure to take those steps 
requisite to establishing a regional school system." 
(c) "As a practical matter ... it is hard to envision a situation in 
which the establishment of a regional school district would not require 
a well-planned construction program." 
(2) Maya regional school district assess at a fiat rate (i.e., $1.00) a 
member town for its share of construction costs for an elementary 
school to be constructed in another town within the regional district? 
Yes, but "only where such fiat rate assessment is made in accordance 
with the agreement [General Laws, Chapter 71, Section 16] between 
the towns comprising the school district. It is for the towns to work 
out between themselves the amount each will contribute to construc-
tion costs. The fact [that] the amount agreed upon is expressed in terms 
of dollar amounts instead of a mathematical ratio or proportion would 
not invalidate that part of the agreement." 
§20.27. Placement of emotionally disturbed children. Under Gen-
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eral Laws, Chapter 71, Section 461, is a parent' entitled to be reimbursed 
for expenses incurred in caring for his twin sons at a private school for 
emotionally disturbed children, for the 1963-1964 school year, when the 
commitment of the children to the school has not received the prior 
approval of the Department of Education or the Governor? (Question 
raised by the Commissioner of Education.) 
In his opinion of October 29, 1964, the Attorney General held that 
the Department may not approve the parent's request for reimburse-
ment incurred in the 1963-1964 period. The statute contemplates that 
the act of "sending" an emotionally disturbed child to a school, or like 
institution, is to be the act of the Department of Education and not of 
the parents. 
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